We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on the case of two players with additive valuation functions and our purpose is twofold. First, our main result provides a complete characterization of truthful mechanisms that allocate all the items to the players. Our characterization reveals an interesting structure underlying all truthful mechanisms, showing that they can be decomposed into two components: a selection part where players pick their best subset among prespeci ed choices determined by the mechanism, and an exchange part where players are o ered the chance to exchange certain subsets if it is favorable to do so. In the remaining paper, we apply our main result and derive several consequences on the design of mechanisms with fairness guarantees. We consider various notions of fairness, (indicatively, maximin share guarantees and envy-freeness up to one item) and provide tight bounds for their approximability. Our work se les some of the open problems in this agenda, and we conclude by discussing possible extensions to more players.
INTRODUCTION
We study a very elementary and fundamental model for allocating indivisible goods from a mechanism design viewpoint. Namely, we consider a set of indivisible items that need to be allocated to a set of players. An outcome of the problem is an allocation of all the items to the players, i.e., a partition into bundles, and each player evaluates an allocation by his own additive valuation function. Our primary motivation originates from the fair division literature, where such models have been considered extensively. However, the same se ing also appears in several domains, including job scheduling, load balancing and many other resource allocation problems. e focus of our work is on understanding the interplay between truthfulness and fairness in this se ing. Hence, we want to identify the e ects on fairness guarantees, imposed by eliminating any incentives for the players to misreport their valuation functions. is type of questions has been posed already in previous works and for various notions of fairness, such as envy-freeness, or for the concept of maximin shares [see, among others, 1, 9, 22] . However, the results so far have been rather scarce in the sense that a) in most cases, they concern impossibility results which are far from being tight and b) the proof techniques are based on constructing speci c families of instances that do not enhance our understanding on the structure of truthful mechanisms, with the exception of Caragiannis et al. [9] which, however, is only for two players and two items.
In order to comprehend the trade-o s that are inherent between incentives and fairness, we rst take a step back and focus solely on truthfulness itself. As is quite common in fair division models, we will not allow any monetary transfers, so that a mechanism simply outputs an allocation of the items. Hence, the question we want to begin with is: what is the structure of truthful allocation mechanisms?
ere has been already a signi cant volume of works on characterizing truthful allocation mechanisms for indivisible items, yet there are some important di erences from our approach. First, a typical line of work studies this question under the additional assumption of Pareto e ciency or related notions [15, 21, 26] . e characterization results that have been obtained show that the combination of truthfulness together with Pareto e ciency tends to make the class of available deterministic mechanisms very poor; only some types of dictatorship survive when imposing both criteria. Second, in some cases the analysis is carried out without any restrictions on the class of valuation functions, which again o en results in a very limited class of mechanisms [see, e.g., 27] . When moving to a speci c class, such as the class of additive functions which is usualy assumed in fair division, it is conceivable that we can have a much richer class of truthful mechanisms. e results above indicate that the known characterizations of truthful mechanisms are also dependent on further assumptions, which may be well justi ed in various scenarios, but they are not aligned with the goal of fair division.
Contribution
Our main result is a characterization of deterministic truthful mechanisms that allocate all the items to two players with additive valuations. In doing so, we identify some important allocation properties that every truthful mechanism should satisfy. One such crucial property is the notion of controlling items (De nition 3.10); we say that a player controls an item, whenever it is possible to report values that will guarantee him this item, regardless of the other player's valuation function. We show that truthfulness implies that every item is controlled by some player. Exploiting this property further, greatly helps us in understanding how a mechanism operates. Consequently, our analysis and the characterization we eventually obtain reveals an interesting structure underlying all truthful mechanisms; they can all be essentially decomposed into two components: (i) a selection part where players pick their best subset among prespeci ed choices determined by the mechanism, and (ii) an exchange part where players are o ered the chance to exchange certain subsets if it is favorable to do so. Hence, we call them picking-exchange mechanisms.
Next, we apply our main result and derive several consequences on the design of mechanisms with (approximate) fairness guarantees. We consider various notions of fairness in Section 4, starting our discussion with the more standard ones such as proportionality and envy-freeness, and explaining why such concepts cannot be a ained-even approximately-by truthful mechanisms. We then focus on more recently studied relaxations of either envy-freeness or proportionality where positive algorithmic results have been obtained (e.g., nding allocations that are envy-free up to one item, or achieve approximate maximin share guarantees). For these notions, we provide tight bounds on the approximation guarantees of truthful mechanisms, se ling some of the open problems in this area [1, 9] . Interestingly, our results also reveal that the best truthful approximation algorithms for fair division are achieved by ordinal mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that exploit only the relative ranking of the items and not the cardinal information of the valuation functions. e heart of our approach for obtaining lower bounds on the approximability of fairness criteria, is a necessary condition for fairness in view of our notion of control, which we call no control of pairs. It states that no player should control more than one item. We show how this condition summarizes minimum requirements for various fairness concepts previously studied in the literature. Although this condition does not o er an alternative fairness criterion, it is a useful tool for showing lower bounds.
Finally, in Section 5 we provide a general class of truthful mechanisms for the case of multiple players. is class generalizes picking-exchange mechanisms in a non-trivial way. As indicated by our mechanisms, there is a much richer structure in the case of multiple players. In particular, the notion of control does not convey enough information anymore. Instead, there seem to exist several di erent levels of control.
Related Work
e only work we are aware of, in which a full characterization is given for truthful mechanisms with indivisible items, additive valuations, and no further assumptions is by Caragiannis et al. [9] . However, this is only a characterization for two players and two items. Apart from characterizations, there have been several works that try to quantify the e ects of truthfulness on several concepts of fairness. For the performance of truthful mechanisms with respect to envy-freeness, see Caragiannis et al. [9] and Lipton et al. [22] , whereas for max-min fairness see Bezakova and Dani [4] . Coming to more recent results and along the same spirit, Amanatidis et al. [1] and Markakis and Psomas [23] study the notion of maximin share allocations, and a related notion of worst-case guarantees respectively. ey obtain separation results, showing that the approximation factors achievable by truthful mechanisms are strictly worse than the known algorithmic (nontruthful) results. Obtaining a be er understanding for the structure of truthful mechanisms and how they a ect fairness has been an open problem underlying all the above works. For a be er and more complete elaboration on fairness and the numerous fairness concepts that have been suggested, we refer the reader to the books [7, 25, 32] and the recent surveys [5, 30] . ere has been a long series of works on characterizing mechanisms with indivisible items beyond the context of fair divison. Many works characterize the allocation mechanisms that arise when we combine truthfulness with Pareto e ciency [see, e.g., 15, 21, 26] . Typically, such mechanisms tend to be dictatorial, and it is also well known that economic e ciency is mostly incompatible with fairness [see, e.g., 5]. Another assumption that has been used is nonbossiness, which means that one cannot change the outcome without a ecting his own bundle. For instance, Svensson [34] assumes nonbossiness in a se ing where each player is interested in acquiring only one item. For general valuations, this also leads to dictatorial algorithms [27] . In most of these works ties are ignored by considering strict preference orders over all subsets of the items, while in some cases it is also allowed for the mechanism not to allocate all the items.
ere have also been relevant works for the se ing of divisible goods [see, among others, 10, 13]. We note that for additive valuation functions, a mechanism for divisible items can be interpreted as a randomized mechanism for indivisible items. is connection is already discussed and explored in Aziz et al. [3] , Guo and Conitzer [19] . In our work, we do not study randomized mechanisms, however it is an interesting question to have characterization results for such se ings as well. Along this direction, see Mennle and Seuken [24] where a relaxed notion of truthfulness is studied.
Related to our work is also the literature on exchange markets. ese are models where players are equipped with an initial endowment, e.g., a house or a set of items. For the case where players can have multiple indivisible items as their initial endowment, see Pápai [28, 29] Finally, for se ings with payments, the work of Dobzinski and Sundararajan [14] , and independently of Christodoulou et al. [11] , provided a characterization of truthful mechanisms with two players and additive valuations when all items are allocated. However, their characterization does not apply to our se ing because they make an additional assumption, namely decisiveness. It roughly requires that each player should be able to receive any possible bundle of items, by making an appropriate bid. eir motivation is the characterization of truthful mechanisms with bounded makespan (maximum nishing time) for the scheduling problem, and in their case decisiveness is necessary in order to achieve bounded guarantees. In our case, our motivation is fairness, and decisiveness is a very strong assumption which has the opposite e ects of what we need; e.g., assigning the full-bundle to a player is unacceptable in terms of fairness. Finally, Christodoulou and Kovács [12] give a global characterization of envy-free and truthful mechanisms for se ings with payments, when there are multiple players but only two items.
PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATION
With the exception of Section 5, we consider a se ing with two players and a set of m indivisible items, M = {1, . . . , m} = [m], to be allocated to the players. We assume that each player i has an additive valuation function i over the items, so that for every
We say that (S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S k ) is a partition of a set S, if i ∈[k ] S i = S, and S i ∩ S j = ∅ for any i, j ∈ [k] with i j. Note that we do not require that S i ∅ for all i ∈ [n]. An allocation of M to the players is a partition in the form S = (S 1 , S 2 ). By M we denote the set of all allocations of M.
e set V m of all possible pro les is R m + × R m + , i.e., we assume that i j > 0 for every i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ M. For some statements we need the assumption that the players' valuation functions are such that no two sets have the same value. So, let V m denote the set of such pro les, i.e.,
A deterministic allocation mechanism with no monetary transfers, or simply a mechanism, for allocating all the items in M = [m], is a mapping X from V m to M. at is, for any pro le v, the outcome of the mechanism is X(v) = (X 1 (v), X 2 (v)) ∈ M, and X i (v) denotes the set of items player i receives.
A mechanism X is truthful if for any instance v = ( 1 , 2 ), any player i ∈ {1, 2}, and any i :
Since we will repeatedly argue about intersections of X i (v) with various subsets of M, we use
Fairness concepts 1
Several notions have emerged throughout the years as to what can be considered a fair allocation. We de ne below the concepts that we will examine in Section 4. Although all concepts can be clearly de ned for any number of players, we provide the de nitions for two players, since this is the focus of the paper. We start with two of the most dominant solution concepts in fair division, namely proportionality and envy-freeness.
De nition 2.1. An allocation
Proportionality was considered in the very rst work on fair division by Steinhaus [33] . Envyfreeness was suggested later by Gamow and Stern [17] , and with a more formal argumentation by Foley [16] and Varian [35] .
Envy-freeness is a stricter notion than proportionality, but even for the la er existence cannot be guaranteed under indivisible goods. One can also consider approximation versions of these problems as follows: Given an instance I , let E(I ) be the minimum possible envy that can be achieved at I , among all possible allocations. We say that a mechanism achieves a ρ-approximation, if for every instance I , it produces an allocation where the envy between any pair of players is at most ρE(I ). Similarly for proportionality, suppose that an instance I admits an allocation where every player receives a value of at least c(I ) 2 i (M) for some c(I ) ≤ 1. en a ρ-approximation would mean that each player is guaranteed a bundle with value at least ρc(I ) 2
i (M). Apart from the approximation versions, the fact that we cannot always have proportional or envy-free allocations gives rise to relaxations of these de nitions, with the hope of obtaining more positive results. We describe below three such relaxations, all of which admit either exact or constant-factor approximation algorithms (not necessarily truthful) in polynomial time.
e rst such relaxation is the concept of envy-freeness up to one item, where each person may envy another player by an amount which does not exceed the value of a single item in the other player's bundle. Formally:
is envy-free up to one item, if there exists an item a 1 ∈ S 1 , and an item a 2 ∈ S 2 , such that
It is quite easy to achieve envy-freeness up to one item, e.g., a round-robin algorithm that alternates between the players and gives them in each step their best remaining item su ces. Other algorithms are also known to satisfy this criterion [see 22].
A more interesting relaxation from an algorithmic point of view, comes from the notion of maximin share guarantees, recently proposed by Budish [8] . For two players, the maximin share of a player i is the value that he could achieve by being the cu er in a discretized form of the cut and choose protocol. is is a guarantee for player i, if he would partition the items into two bundles so as to maximize the value of the least valued bundle. We de ne below the approximate version of this notion.
De nition 2.3. Given a set of items [m]
, the maximin share of a player i ∈ {1, 2}, is
For two players maximin share allocations always exist and even though they are NP-hard to compute, we have a PTAS by reducing this to standard job scheduling problems. Hence each player can receive a value of at least (1 − ϵ)µ i . For a higher number of players, constant factor approximation algorithms also exist [see 2, 31] .
Finally, a related approach was undertaken by Hill [20] . is work examined what is the worst case guarantee that a player can have as a function of the total number of players and the maximum value of an item across all players. For two players, the following function was identi ed precisely ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2017. as the guarantee that can be given to each player. Note that the total value of the items is normalized to 1 in this case.
De nition 2.4. Let V 2 : [0, 1] → [0, 1/2] be the unique nonincreasing function satisfying V 2 (α) = 1/2 for α = 0, whereas for α > 0:
where for any integer k ≥ 1,
Markakis and Psomas [23] proved that for two players, there always exists an allocation such that each player i receives at least V 2 (α i ), where α i = max j ∈[m] i j . e approximation version of this notion would be to construct allocations where each player receives a value of at least ρV 2 (α i ).
Recently, a stricter variant of this guarantee has been provided by Gourvès et al. [18] (also see Remark 4.9).
CHARACTERIZATION OF TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS
We present our main characterization result in this section. We start in subsection 3.1 with the main de nitions and illustrating examples, and then we state our result in subsection 3.2 along with a road map of the proof. To avoid repetition, when referring to a truthful mechanism X, we mean a truthful mechanism for allocating all the items in M to two players with additive valuation functions.
A Non-Dictatorial Class of Mechanisms
e main result of this section is that every truthful mechanism is a picking-exchange mechanism ( eorem 3.9). Before we make a precise statement, we formally de ne the types of mechanisms involved and provide illustrating examples.
Picking Mechanisms. We start with a family of mechanisms where players make a selection out of choices that the mechanism o ers to them. Given a subset S of items, we de ne a set of o ers O on S, as a nonempty collection of proper subsets of S that exactly covers S (i.e., T ∈ O T = S), and in which there is no common element that appears in all subsets (i.e., T ∈ O T = ∅).
De nition 3.1.
A mechanism X is a picking mechanism 2 if there exists a partition (N 1 , N 2 ) of M, and sets of o ers O 1 and O 2 on N 1 and N 2 respectively, such that for every pro le v,
Technical nuances aside, such a mechanism can be implemented by rst le ing player 1 choose his best o er from O 1 and giving what remains from N 1 to player 2. en it lets player 2 choose his best o er from O 2 and gives what remains from N 2 to player 1. e following example illustrates a picking mechanism. 
On input v, X rst gives to player 1 his best set-with respect to 1 -among {1, 2}, {2, 3} and {4}, and then gives what remains from N 1 to player 2. Next, X gives to player 2 his best set-according to 2 -among {5} and {6}, and then gives what remains from N 2 to player 1. X resolves ties lexicographically, e.g., in case of a tie, {1, 2} is preferred to {4}.
It is not hard to see that X is truthful. For the following input , the circles denote the allocation. =  3  5  5  10  4  2  2  3  6  1  5  3 .
Exchange Mechanisms. We now move to a quite di erent class of mechanisms. Let X , Y be two disjoint subsets of M. We call the ordered pair (X , Y ) an exchange deal. Moreover, we say that an
. Let S and T be two disjoint subsets of items and let S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S k and T 1 , . . . ,T k be two collections of nonempty and pairwise disjoint subsets of S and T respectively. We say then that the set of exchange deals
Moreover, I contains the indices of every favorable exchange deal with respect to v, but no indices of unfavorable exchange deals.
On a high level, an exchange mechanism initially partitions the items into endowments for the players, and then examines a list of possible exchange deals. Every exchange that improves both players is performed, while every exchange that reduces the value of even one player is avoided. e mechanism may also perform other exchanges where one player is indi erent and the other player can be either indi erent or improved. Whether such exchange deals are materialized or not is up to the tie-breaking rule employed by the mechanism. e following example illustrates an exchange mechanism.
Example 3.4. Let M = {1, . . . 5}, and consider the following mechanism Y, with E 1 = {1, 2, 3}, E 2 = {4, 5}, and a valid set of exchange deals D = {({2, 3}, {4})} on (E 1 , E 2 ): One can think of such a mechanism as if Y initially reserves the set E 1 for player 1 and the set E 2 for player 2. en it examines whether exchanging {2, 3} with {4} strictly improves both players, and performs the exchange only if the answer is yes. Mechanism Y is an example of an exchange mechanism with only one possible exchange deal. Again, one can see that no player has an incentive to lie.
For the following input , the circles denote the allocation produced. .
Picking-Exchange Mechanisms. Finally, we de ne the class of picking-exchange mechanisms which is a generalization of both picking and exchange mechanisms.
De nition 3.5. A mechanism X is a picking-exchange mechanism if there exists a partition 
contains the indices of all favorable exchange deals, but no indices of unfavorable exchange deals.
It is helpful to think that a picking-exchange mechanism runs independently a picking mechanism on N 1 ∪ N 2 and an exchange mechanism on E 1 ∪ E 2 , like in Example 3.6. Although this is true under the assumption that the players' valuation functions are such that no two sets have the same value, it is not true for general additive valuations. e reason is that the tie-breaking for choosing the o ers from O 1 and O 2 may not be independent from the decision of whether to perform each exchange that is neither favorable nor unfavorable. e following example illustrates a picking exchange mechanism.
Example 3.6. Let M = {1, . . . , 11}, and consider the mechanism Z that partitions .
Truthfulness and Picking-Exchange Mechanisms
Essentially, we show that a mechanism is truthful if and only if it is a picking-exchange mechanism.
We begin with the easier part of our characterization, namely that under the assumption that each valuation function induces a strict preference relation over all possible subsets, every pickingexchange mechanism is truthful. Recall that the set of such pro les is denoted by V m . T 3.7. When restricted to V m , every picking-exchange mechanism X for allocating m items is truthful. Remark 3.8. For simplicity, eorem 3.7 is stated for a subclass of additive valuation functions. However, it holds for general additive valuations as long as the mechanism uses a sensible tiebreaking rule (e.g., label-based or welfare-based). 4 We are now ready to state the main result of this work. T 3.9. Every truthful mechanism X can be implemented as a picking-exchange mechanism.
e rest of this subsection is a road map to the proof of eorem 3.9. e proof is long and technical, so for the sake of presentation, it is broken down to several lemmata. In order to illustrate the high-level ideas, the proofs of those lemmata are deferred to the full version of the paper.
For the rest of this subsection we assume a truthful mechanism X for allocating all the items in M = [m] to two players with additive valuation functions. Every statement is going to be with respect to this X.
3.2.1
The Crucial Notion of Control. We begin by introducing the notions of strong desire and of control, which are of key importance for our characterization. We say that player i strongly desires a set S if each item in S has more value for him than all the items of M S combined, i.e., if for every x ∈ S we have ix > ∈M S i . De nition 3.10. We say that player i controls a set S with respect to X, if every time he strongly desires S he gets it whole, i.e., for every v = ( 1 , 2 ) in which player i strongly desires S, then we have that S ⊆ X i (v) . 4 Describing all such tie-breaking rules seems to be an interesting, nontrivial question for future work, but not our main focus here. It is not hard to see, though, that there exist tie-breaking rules that make a picking-exchange mechanism nontruthful, e.g., break ties on o ers of player 1 so that the value that player 2 gets from N 1 is minimized. Clearly, given X, any set S can be controlled by at most one player. e following is a key lemma for understanding how truthful mechanisms operate. e lemma together with Corollary 3.12 below show that every item is controlled by some player under any truthful mechanism. L 3.11 (C L ). Let S ⊆ M. If there exists a pro le v = ( 1 , 2 ) such that both players strongly desire S, and S ⊆ X i (v) for some i ∈ {1, 2}, then player i controls every T ⊆ S with respect to X.
P
. Let v = ( 1 , 2 ) be a pro le such that both players strongly desire S and S ⊆ X 1 (v) (the case where S ⊆ X 2 (v) is symmetric). We rst prove the statement for T = S. Let v = ( 1 , 2 ) be any pro le in which player 1 strongly desires S, i.e., 1x > ∈M S 1 , ∀x ∈ S. Initially, consider the intermediate pro le v * = ( 1 , 2 ). If S ∩ X 2 (v * ) ∅ then player 2 would deviate from pro le v to v * in order to strictly improve his total utility. So by truthfulness we derive that S ⊆ X 1 (v * ). Similarly, in the pro le v , if S ∩ X 2 (v ) ∅ then player 1 would deviate from v to v * in order to strictly improve. us by truthfulness we have S ⊆ X 1 (v ). We conclude that player 1 controls S. Now, suppose that v = ( 1 , 2 ) is any pro le in which player 1 strongly desires T S. If T X 1 (v ) then player 1 could strictly improve his utility by playing 1 from before (i.e., he declares that he strongly desires S) and ge ing S T . us, by truthfulness, T ⊆ X 1 (v ), and we conclude that player 1 controls T .
Notice here that the existence of sets that are controlled by some player is always guaranteed. Speci cally, each singleton {x } is always controlled (only) by one of the players. Indeed, when both players strongly desire {x }, it is always the case that {x } ⊆ X i (v) for some i ∈ {1, 2}. is is summarized in the following corollary. 3.12. Let X be a truthful mechanism for allocating the items in M to two players with additive valuations. For every x ∈ M there exists i ∈ {1, 2} such that only player i controls {x } with respect to X.
Aside from its use in the current proof, the corollary has implications on fairness, that will be explored in Section 4.
Identifying the Components of a Mechanism.
Our goal now is to determine the "exchange component" and the "picking component" of mechanism X. Every picking-exchange mechanism is completely determined by the seven sets N 1 , N 2 , O 1 , O 2 , E 1 , E 2 , and D mentioned in De nition 3.5 (plus a deterministic tie-breaking rule). Below we try to identify these sets. Later we show that the mechanism's behavior is identical to that of a picking-exchange mechanism de ned by them.
To proceed, we will need to consider the collection of all maximal sets controlled by each player. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Clearly, every set controlled by player i is a subset of an element of A i . According to Lemma 3.11, if we consider the set C i = S ∈A i S, i.e., the union of all the sets in A i , this is exactly the set of items that are controlled-as singletons-by player i. Using the A i s and the C i s, we de ne the sets of interest that determine the mechanism. We begin with E i = S ∈A i S for i ∈ {1, 2}. As we are going to see eventually in Lemma 3.21, the "exchange component" of X is observed on E 1 ∪ E 2 . Of course, at this point it is not clear whether D is well de ned as a valid set of exchange deals, and this is probably the most challenging part of the characterization. Next, we de ne
. As shown in Lemmata 3.14 and 3.15, we identify the "picking component" of X on N 1 ∪ N 2 , and O i will correspond to the set of o ers.
Note that by Corollary 3.13 and the above de nitions, (N 1 , N 2 , E 1 , E 2 ) is a partition of M. e intuition behind breaking C i into N i and E i is that player i has di erent levels of control on those two sets. e fact that E i is contained in every maximal set controlled by player i will turn out to mean that X gives the ownership of E i to player i. On the other hand, the control of player i on N i is much more restricted as shown below.
3.2.3
Cracking the Picking Component. e rst step is to show that the O i s de ned above, greatly restrict the possible allocations of the items of N 1 ∪ N 2 . In particular, whatever player i receives from N i must be contained in some set of O i . 
e idea behind the proof of Lemma 3.14 is that by receiving some X N i i (v) not contained in any set of O i , player i is able to extend his control to subsets not contained in C i , thus leading to contradiction. e proof, as many of the proofs of the remaining lemmata, includes the careful construction of a series of pro les, where in each step one has to argue about how the allocation does or does not change.
Given the restriction implied by Lemma 3.14, next we can prove that the subset of N i that player i receives must be the best possible from his perspective, hence the mechanism behaves as a picking mechanism on each N i . Intuitively, suppose that player 1 receives a subset S of N 1 which is not an element of O 1 . By Lemma 3.14, S is contained in an element S of O 1 . Since player 1 controls S , this means that he gave up part of his control to gain something that he was not supposed to. Actually, it can be shown that it is the case where player 2 also gave part of his control (either on N 2 or E 2 ). is mutual transfer of control, combined with truthfulness, eventually leads to pro les where some of the items must be given to both players at the same time, hence a contradiction. 
Now we know that X behaves as the "right" picking-exchange mechanism on N 1 ∪ N 2 . For most of the rest of the proof we would like to somehow ignore this part of X and focus on E 1 ∪ E 2 .
Separating the Two Components.
As mentioned right a er De nition 3.5, there is some kind of independence between the two components of a picking-exchange mechanism, at least when restricted on V m . is independence should be present in X as well; in fact we are going to exploit it to get rid of N 1 ∪ N 2 until the last part of the proof. Session 8a: Mechanism Design -General EC'17, June 26-30, 2017, Cambridge, MA, USA e lemma states that assuming strict preferences over all subsets, the allocation of E 1 ∪ E 2 does not depend on the values of either player for the items in N 1 ∪ N 2 . What allows this separation is the complete lack of ties in the restricted pro le space.
Without loss of generality we may assume that E 1 ∪ E 2 = [ ]. We can de ne a mechanism X E for allocating the items of [ ] to two players with valuation pro les in V as
where v is any pro le in V m with i j = i j for all i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ [ ]. is new mechanism is just the projection of X on E 1 ∪ E 2 restricted on a domain where it is well-de ned. e truthfulness of X E on V follows directly from the truthfulness of X on V m . Moreover, it is easy to see that player i controls E i with respect to X E , for i ∈ {1, 2}.
e plan is to study X E instead of X, show that X E is an exchange mechanism, and nally sew the two parts of X back together and show that everything works properly for any pro le in V m . One issue here is that maybe the set of feasible exchanges with respect to X E is greatly reduced, in comparison to the set of feasible exchanges with respect to X, because of the restriction on the domain. In such a case, it will not be possible to argue about exchanges in D that are not feasible anymore. It turns out that this is not the case; the set of possible allocations (of E 1 ∪ E 2 ) is the same, whether we consider pro les in V m or in V m . In particular, the set of feasible exchanges on E 1 ∪ E 2 is exactly the same for X and X E , and thus we will utilize the following set of exchanges. D = {(S,T ) | (S,T ) is a minimal feasible exchange with respect to X E } .
Cracking the Exchange Component.
In the a empt to show that X E is an exchange mechanism, the rst step is to show that D is indeed a valid set of exchange deals. e above lemma involves three main steps. First we show that each minimally exchangeable set is involved in exactly one exchange deal. en, we guarantee that minimally exchangeable sets can be exchanged only with minimally exchangeable sets, and nally, we show that minimally exchangeable sets are always disjoint. ere is a common underlying idea in the proofs of these steps: whenever there exist two feasible exchanges that overlap in any way, we can construct a pro le where both of them are favorable but the two players disagree on which of them is best. On a high level, each player can "block" his least favorable of the con icting exchanges, and this leads to violation of truthfulness. Lemma 3.18 implies that every exchangeable set S ⊆ E 1 can be decomposed as S = W ∪ i ∈I S i , where W = S i ∈I S i does not contain any minimally exchangeable sets. Ideally, we would like two things. First, the set W in the above decomposition to always be empty, i.e., every exchangeable set should be a union of minimally exchangeable sets. Second, we want every union of minimally exchangeable subsets of E 1 to be exchangeable only with the corresponding union of minimally exchangeable subsets of E 2 , and vice versa. It takes several lemmas and a rather involved induction to prove those. A key ingredient of the inductive step is a carefully constructed argument about the value that each player must gain from any exchange. 
contains exactly the indices of all favorable exchange deals in D.
3.2.6
Pu ing the Mechanism Back Together. As a result of Lemma 3.20 (combined, of course, with Lemmata 3.15 and 3.16), the characterization is complete for truthful mechanisms de ned on V m . For general additive valuation functions, however, we need a li le more work. is is to counterbalance the fact that in the presence of ties the allocations of N 1 ∪ N 2 and E 1 ∪ E 2 may not be independent.
By Lemmata 3.17 and 3.19, we know that for any v ∈ V m , X E 1 ∪E 2
1
(v) is the result of some exchanges of D taking place. ere are two things that can go wrong: X performs an unfavorable exchange, or it does not perform a favorable one. In either of these cases it is possible to construct some pro le in V m that leads to contradiction. Hence we have the following lemma.
contains the indices of all favorable exchange deals in D, but no indices of unfavorable exchange deals.
Clearly, Lemma 3.21, together with Lemma 3.15 concludes the proof of eorem 3.9.
Immediate Implications of Theorem 3.9
As mentioned in Section 1.2, there are several works characterizing truthful mechanisms in combination with other notions, such as Pareto e ciency, nonbossiness, and neutrality (these results are usually for unrestricted, not necessarily additive valuations). Pareto e ciency means that there is no other allocation where one player strictly improves and none of the others are worse-o . Nonbossiness means that a player cannot a ect the outcome of the mechanism without changing his own bundle of items. Finally, neutrality refers to a mechanism being consistent with a permutation on the items, i.e., permuting the items results in the corresponding permuted allocation.
Although such notions are not our main focus, the purpose of this short discussion is twofold. On one hand, we illustrate how our characterization immediately implies a characterization for mechanisms that satisfy these extra properties under additive valuations, and on the other hand we see how these properties are either incompatible with fairness or irrelevant in our context.
To begin with, nonbossiness comes for free in our case, since we have two players and all the items must be allocated. Neutrality and Pareto e ciency, however, greatly reduce the space of available mechanisms. Note that it makes more sense to study neutral mechanisms when the valuation functions induce a strict preference order over all sets of items. C 3.22. Every neutral, truthful mechanism X on V m can be implemented as a pickingexchange mechanism, such that 3.23. Every Pareto e cient, truthful mechanism X can be implemented as a pickingexchange mechanism, such that It is somewhat surprising that the resulting mechanisms are a strict superset of dictatorships, even when we impose both properties together. Pareto e ciency, however, allows only mechanisms that are rather close to being dictatorial, and thus cannot guarantee fairness of any type. On the other hand, most of the mechanisms de ned and studied in Section 4 are neutral, yet neutrality is not implied by the fairness concepts we consider, nor the other way around.
A NECESSARY FAIRNESS CONDITION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
In this section, we explore some implications of eorem 3.9 on fairness properties, i.e., on the design of mechanisms where on top of truthfulness, we would like to achieve fairness guarantees.
In Section 4.1 we show that the Control Lemma implies that truthfulness prevents any bounded approximation for envy-freeness and proportionality. en, we move on describing a necessary fairness condition, in terms of our notion of "control", that summarizes a common feature of several relaxations of fairness and provide a restricted version of our characterization that follows this fairness condition. is will allow us, in Section 4.2, to examine what this new class of mechanisms can achieve in each of these fairness concepts.
Implications of the Control Lemma.
4.1.1 Control of singletons. e basic restriction that truthfulness imposes to every mechanism (leading to poor results for some fairness concepts) comes from Corollary 3.12, an immediate corollary of the Control Lemma, stating that every single item is controlled by some player.
We begin by studing how the above corollary a ects two of the most researched notions in the fair division literature, namely proportionality and envy-freeness. It is well known that even without the requirement for truthfulness, it is impossible to achieve any of these two objectives, simply because in the presence of indivisible goods, envy-free or proportional allocations may not exist. 5 is leads to the de nition of approximation versions of these two concepts for se ings with indivisible goods. For example, one could try to construct algorithms such that for every instance, an approximation to the minimum possible envy admi ed by the instance is guaranteed. Similarly, approximate proportionality can be considered, i.e., nd allocations that achieve an approximation to the best possible value that an instance can guarantee to all agents. See also the discussion in Section 2 on de ning the approximation versions of these problems. Note that if time complexity is not an issue, we can always identify the allocation with the best possible envy or with the best possible proportionality, achievable by a given instance.
We are now ready to state our rst application, showing that truthfulness prohibits us from having any approximation to the minimum envy or to proportionality. is greatly improves the conclusions of Lipton et al. [22] and Caragiannis et al. [9] that truthful mechanisms cannot a ain the optimal minimum envy allocation.
For any truthful mechanism that allocates all the items to two players with additive valuations, the approximation achieved for either proportionality or the minimum envy is arbitrarily bad (i.e., not lower bounded by any positive function of m).
P
. Consider a se ing with m items, and a truthful mechanism X. Suppose now that item 1 is controlled by player 1 with respect to X. is means that in the pro le v = ([m 1 1 . . . 1], [m d 1 1 . . . 1]) player 1 must obtain item 1, and player 2 ends up with a negligible fraction of his total value for large enough d. e optimal solution would be to assign the rst item to the 5 Consider, for instance, a pro le where both players desire only the rst item and have a negligible value for the other items. en one of the players will necessarily remain unsatis ed and receive a value close to zero, no ma er what the allocation is. '17, June 26-30, 2017 , Cambridge, MA, USA second player and the last m items to the rst player, which provides an envy-free and proportional allocation. We conclude that the approximation guarantee that can be obtained by a truthful mechanism is arbitrarily high.
So far, the conclusion is that even approximate proportionality or envy-freeness are quite stringent and incompatible with truthfulness because of the Control Lemma. e next step would be to relax these notions. ere have been already a few approaches on relaxing proportionality and envy-freeness under indivisible goods, leading to solutions such as the maximin share fairness, envy-freeness up to one item [8] , as well as the type of worst-case guarantees proposed by Hill [20] (recall De nitions 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 in Section 2). e fact that a truthful mechanism X yields control of singletons does not seem to have such detrimental e ects on these notions. However, if even a single pair of items is controlled by a player, the same situation arises. 4.1.2 Control of pairs. We propose the following necessary (but not su cient) condition that captures a common aspect of all these relaxations of fairness. is allows us to treat all the above concepts of fairness in a uni ed way.
De nition 4.2. We say that a mechanism X yields control of pairs if there exists i ∈ {1, 2} and S ⊆ [m] with |S | = 2, such that player i controls S with respect to X.
e following lemma states that in order to obtain impossibility results for the above concepts, it is enough to focus on mechanisms with control of pairs. L 4.3. In order to achieve (either exactly or within a bounded approximation) the above mentioned relaxed fairness criteria, a truthful mechanism that allocates all the items to two players with additive valuations cannot yield control of pairs.
So now we are ready to move to a complete characterization of truthful mechanisms that do not yield control of pairs. Of course such mechanisms are picking-exchange mechanisms, but our fairness condition allows only singleton o ers, and the exchange part is completely degenerate.
De nition 4.4. A mechanism X for allocating all the items in [m] to two players is a singleton picking-exchange mechanism if it is a picking-exchange mechanism where for each i ∈ {1, 2} at most one of N i and E i is nonempty, |E i | ≤ 1, and
i.e., the sets of o ers contain all possible singletons.
Hence, typically, in a singleton picking-exchange mechanism player i receives from N i ∪ E i only his best item. Moreover, for m ≥ 3, no exchanges are allowed. 6 L 4.5. Every truthful mechanism for allocating all the items to two players with additive valuation functions that does not yield control of pairs can be implemented as a singleton pickingexchange mechanism.
It is interesting to note that, in contrast to Application 4.1, proving Lemma 4.5 without eorem 3.9 is not straightforward. In fact, it requires a partial characterization which (on a high level) is similar to characterizing the picking component of general mechanisms.
Applications to Relaxed Notions of Fairness
It is now possible to apply Lemma 4.5 on each fairness notion separately, and characterize every truthful mechanism that achieves each criterion.
Envy-freeness up to one item. We start with a relaxation of envy-freeness. Below we provide a complete description of the mechanisms that satisfy this criterion. A 4.6. For m ≤ 3, every singleton picking-exchange mechanism achieves envy-freeness up to one item. For m = 4 every singleton picking-exchange mechanism with |N 1 | = |N 2 | = 2 achieves envy-freeness up to one item. Finally, for m ≥ 5 there is no truthful mechanism that allocates all the items to two players and achieves envy-freeness up to one item.
Maximin share fairness and related notions. For maximin share allocations a truthful mechanism was suggested by Amanatidis et al. [1] for any number of items and any number of players. For two players, their mechanism is the singleton picking-exchange mechanism with N 1 = [m] and produces an allocation that guarantees to each player a 1 m/2 -approximation of his maximin share. It was le as an open problem whether a be er truthful approximation exists. Here we show that this approximation is tight; in fact, almost any other singleton picking-exchange mechanism performs strictly worse. Note that the best previously known lower bound for two players was 1/2. For any m there exists a singleton picking-exchange mechanism that guarantees to player i a max{2, m}/2 −1 -approximation of µ i , for i ∈ {1, 2}. ere is no truthful mechanism that allocates all the items to two players and achieves a be er guarantee with respect to maximin share fairness.
Regarding now allocations that guarantee an approximation of the function V 2 (α i ) de ned by Hill [20] (recall the de nition in Section 2), the singleton picking-exchange mechanism with N 1 = [m] was also suggested by Markakis and Psomas [23] as a 1 m/2 -approximation of V 2 (α i ). 7 is comes as no surprise, since there exists a strong connection between maximin shares and the function V n , especially for two players. is is illustrated in the following corollary, where both the positive and the negative results coincide with the ones for the maximin share fairness. A 4.8. For any m there exists a singleton picking-exchange mechanism that guarantees to player i a max{2, m}/2 −1 -approximation of V 2 (α i ), for i ∈ {1, 2}, where α i = max j ∈[m] i j . ere is no truthful mechanism that allocates all the items to two players and achieves a be er guarantee with respect to the V 2 (α i )s.
Again, the best previously known lower bound for two players was constant, namely 2/3 due to Markakis and Psomas [23] . In Applications 4.7 and 4.8, it is stated that there exists a 1 m/2 -approximate singleton picking-exchange mechanism. It is interesting that any singleton picking-exchange mechanism does not perform much worse. Following the corresponding proofs, we have that even the worst singleton picking-exchange mechanism achieves a 1 m−1 -approximation in each case. Remark 4.9. Gourvès et al. [18] introduced a variant of V n , called W n , and showed that there always exists an allocation such that each player i receives W n (α i ) ≥ V n (α i ) (where the inequality is o en strict). Since the de nition of W n is rather involved even for n = 2, we defer a formal discussion about it to the full version of the paper. However, it is not hard to show that for every valuation function i we have V 2 (α i ) ≤ W 2 (α i ) ≤ µ i and thus the analog of Application 4.8 holds.
Remark 4.10. Amanatidis et al. [1] made the following interesting observation: every single known truthful mechanism achieving a bounded approximation of maximin share fairness is ordinal, in the sense that it only needs a ranking of the items for each player rather than his whole valuation function. Finding truthful mechanisms that explicitly take into account the players' valuation functions in order to achieve be er guarantees was posed as a major open problem. Note that, weird tie-breaking aside, all singleton picking-exchange mechanisms are ordinal! erefore, from the mechanism designer's perspective, it is impossible to exploit the extra cardinal information given as input and at the same time maintain truthfulness and some nontrivial fairness guarantee.
TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS FOR MANY PLAYERS
We introduce a family of non-dictatorial, truthful mechanisms for any number of players. Our mechanisms are de ned recursively; in analogy to serial dictatorships, the choices of a player de ne the sub-mechanism used to allocate the items to the remaining players. Here, however, this serial behavior is observed "in parallel" in several sets of a partition of M.
A generalized deal between k players is a collection of (up to k(k − 1)) exchange deals between pairs of players. A set D of generalized deals is called valid if all the sets involved in all these exchange deals are nonempty and pairwise disjoint. Given a pro le v = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , n ) we say that a generalized deal is favorable if it strictly improves all the players involved, while it is unfavorable if there exists a player involved whose utility strictly decreases.
De nition 5.1. A mechanism X for allocating all the items in [m] to n players is called a serial picking-exchange mechanism if (1) when n = 1, X always allocates the whole [m] to player 1.
(2) when n ≥ 2, there exist a partition (N 1 , . . . , N n , E 1 , . . . , E n ) of [m], sets of o ers O i on N i for i ∈ [n], a valid set D of generalized deals, and a mapping f from subsets of M to serial picking-exchange mechanisms for n − 1 players, such that for every pro le v = ( 1 , . . . , n ) we have for all i ∈ [n]:
, where E = j ∈[n] E j , is the result of starting with E i and performing some of the deals in D, including all the favorable deals but no unfavorable ones, • the items of N i X N i i (v) are allocated to players in [n] {i} using the serial pickingexchange mechanism f N i X N i i (v) .
Clearly, serial picking-exchange mechanisms are a generalization of picking-exchange mechanisms studied in Section 3. e following example illustrates how such a mechanism looks like for three players. • f is a mapping from subsets of M to picking-exchange mechanisms (for 2 players) e above sets are the analog of the corresponding sets of a picking-exchange mechanism. e deals, however, are a bit more complex. E.g., by ({71}, {88}) 1,2 , ({72, 80}, {95}) 1,3 , ({85}, {99, 100}) 2,3 we denote the deal in which:
-player 1 gives item 71 to player 2 and items 72, 80 to player 3 -player 2 gives item 88 to player 1 and item 85 to player 3 -player 3 gives item 95 to player 1 and items 99, 100 to player 2 e mapping f suggests which truthful mechanism should be used every time there are items le to be allocated to only two players.
We are ready to describe our mechanism X: (1) e mechanism gives endowments E 1 , E 2 , E 3 to the three players and then performs each exchange deal that strictly improves all the players involved. (2) en, for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the mechanism gives to player i his best set in O i , say S i . (3) Finally, for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, X uses mechanism f (N i S i ) to allocate the items of N i S i to players in {1, 2, 3} i.
Like picking-exchange mechanisms, serial picking-exchange mechanisms are truthful, given an appropriate tie-breaking rule (e.g., a label-based tie-breaking rule). To bypass a general discussion about tie-breaking, however, we may assume that each player's valuation induces a strict preference over all subsets of M. We denote by V n,m the set of pro les that only include such valuation functions. Following almost the same proof, however, we have that for general additive valuations every serial picking-exchange mechanism is truthful when using label-based tie-breaking. T 5.3. When restricted to V n,m , every serial picking-exchange mechanism X for allocating m items to n players is truthful.
DISCUSSION
We obtained a nontrivial characterization for truthful mechanisms, that has immediate implications on fairness. A natural question to ask is whether our characterization can be extended for more than two players. Characterizing the truthful mechanisms without money for any number of additive players is, undoubtedly, a fundamental open problem. However, as indicated by De nition 5.1, there seems to be a much richer structure when one a empts to describe such mechanisms, even though serial picking-exchange mechanisms are only a subset of nonbossy truthful mechanisms. In particular, the notion of control that was crucial for identifying the structure of truthful mechanisms for two players does not convey enough information anymore. Instead, there seem to exist several di erent levels of control, and understanding this structure still remains a very interesting and intriguing question.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS is work has been partly supported by the COST Action IC1205 on Computational Social Choice, and by an internal grant of the Athens University of Economics and Business. George Christodoulou was supported by EPSRC EP/M008118/1 and Royal Society LT140046. We also wish to acknowledge the Simons institute for hosting the program on Economics and Computation, as some ideas and preliminary discussions began there.
